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One of the most urgent challenges faced by economies in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) is to increase the pace of their productivity 
growth, which is slow not only compared with developed countries but 
also with other developing and emerging economies (IDB 2013; OECD 
2014). Sluggish productivity growth appears to be the main cause of 
the widening income gap between developed and LAC economies (IDB 
2013; Pagés 2010; Daude and Fernández-Arias 2010).
As discussed in Chap. 1, increasing productivity in the region requires 
strategies that reallocate resources from less productive firms to more 
 productive ones. Recent research, for example, recommends eliminating 
 distortionary policies that artificially create incentives to invest in firms 
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with low formality and productivity levels (e.g. IDB 2013; Pagés 2010; 
OECD 2014). However, efforts should also be made to increase within- 
firm efficiency through policies that improve production technologies and 
managerial processes and facilitate plant-level innovation. In this regard, 
a central issue concerns developing strategies that strengthen skill forma-
tion in the workforce. New evidence shows that a major obstacle faced 
by many firms in the region is the lack of adequate skills in the labor 
force. Enterprises have difficulties filling their vacancies and many indi-
viduals, especially younger people, cannot find jobs because of a mismatch 
between the skills learned in school and the skills demanded by the market 
(Bassi et al. 2012; Mourshad et al. 2011).
Thus, there is a clear need to reform the educational system to facilitate 
the transition of young people to the labor market. However, the agenda 
for change should not stop there, as human capital formation does not end 
with school. Approximately one-quarter of the human capital that individ-
uals accumulate during their lives is achieved after the schooling process is 
completed (Heckman et al. 1998). Among the set of post- schooling invest-
ments, on-the-job training (OJT) can play an essential role. Employer-
provided training is especially crucial to developing and updating skills in 
a context in which preferences and technologies change rapidly (Almeida 
et al. 2012). Through OJT, workers can be more productive, adapt more 
easily to technological change, make more efficient use of capital and 
machinery, and have a positive effect on the performance of their peers.
However, despite the potential of this type of investment, very little 
is known about OJT practices in LAC. Not only is there little evidence 
about the returns on OJT, but there is scant information on its basic char-
acteristics, such as the frequency, content, and beneficiaries (Hunneus 
et  al. 2011). This study aims to contribute to this literature by analyz-
ing two business surveys, which, to our knowledge, are the only ones in 
LAC with comparable cross-country data on OJT practices: the Survey 
on Productivity and Human Resources Training in Establishments (EPFE 
by its Spanish acronym) and the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES). 
Both surveys use a broad definition of OJT, encompassing all types of 
training offered by firms to their active workers.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we characterize OJT 
practices in the region by describing the basic characteristics of these invest-
ments. Both the EPFE and the WBES draw their samples from firms in 
registered directories, which restricts our analysis to the formal sector of the 
economy. Second, by examining correlates and determinants of the training 
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decision, we provide suggestive evidence of the role of different market fail-
ures and constraints affecting OJT investments in LAC. Third, we provide 
additional evidence of the productivity effects of OJT practices in the region.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We review the existing lit-
erature and then discuss the data and present stylized facts that characterize 
OJT in LAC. We present an analysis of the determinants of training invest-
ments among firms in the region, and then provide estimates of the wage 
and productivity effects of OJT. Finally, we make some concluding remarks.
 Existing LitEraturE
The literature on the impact of employer-provided training goes back to 
the seminal work of Becker (1964). This body of work states that, in a 
relatively flexible labor market, financing training and its effect on wages 
depends on the type of skills taught. General training enhances skills that 
are relevant not only to the firm in which the worker is employed but 
also to other firms. Since workers can increase productivity elsewhere, the 
market rewards this training with higher wages. In contrast, a worker’s 
wage does not increase with training in specific skills, since such skills only 
increase productivity in the firm where he or she currently works.
Given that a worker with general skills may leave for another job at any 
time, the firm has no incentive to pay for training for these skills. Any pro-
ductivity gains that the firm may benefit from will be offset by the higher 
wages that have to be paid to retain the worker. Therefore, general training 
is financed by workers indirectly through lower wages during the training 
period. Firms, on the other hand, have incentives to finance specific train-
ing as they may reap the benefits through larger productivity gains.1
Thus, in flexible labor markets, the rents from general training will be 
appropriated by the worker via higher wages, leaving firms with no incen-
tive to invest in this kind of training. This appropriation problem may lead 
to investment in general skills training below the socially desirable level. 
This problem is the first of several market failures that could limit the deci-
sion to invest in OJT. Table 5.1 briefly enumerates market failures that 
affect OJT. A second market failure comes from credit constraints, which 
could limit the investments of employers who have difficulty accessing 
credit to finance OJT, even if such investments are profitable in the long 
run (see Chap. 8). Also, information problems can occur if employers do 
not have important information about key aspects of OJT, such as training 
techniques, training providers, benefits, and costs.
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In addition to these three market failures, which limit the supply of 
employer-provided training, there are also failures that affect demand for 
OJT (Table 5.1). The first is barriers to technological adoption. Training 
demand is derived demand in that training requirements depend on pro-
duction decisions. If a firm does not adopt innovative technologies that 
require more skilled personnel (for whatever reason), it will not need to 
invest in training. Thus, OJT investments are affected by a variety of mar-
ket failures (credit, information, and externalities) that constrain adoption 
of more skill-intensive technologies and production systems. Similar con-
siderations apply to possible constraints to the adoption of sound mana-
gerial practices. For example, credit constraints, lack of information, or 
labor regulations could limit a firm’s ability to invest in modern mana-
gerial practices (e.g. performance incentives, profit sharing, analysis and 
feedback, mentoring, and employee participation in decision-making).2
Motivated by this framework, many researchers have tried to estimate 
the effects of employer-provided training. Most of the literature focuses on 
estimating private returns: studies that use firm data look at the effects on 
productivity, while studies that use employee data estimate wage effects. 
Very few studies directly compare results between general and specific train-
ing, given the difficulty of empirically observing the degree of specificity.





Firms do not have incentives to provide 
general (portable) skills training because they 
do not appropriate the rents of this training.
Credit constraints Firms have limited resources or credit to finance 




Firms have incomplete information or 
uncertainty about key aspects related to the 
benefits, costs, techniques, and providers of OJT.
Restrictions to 
training demand




Firms face barriers that limit the adoption of 
skill-intensive technologies, thereby reducing 
human capital requirements and, therefore, the 
demand for training (e.g., credit constraints, 
information asymmetries, lack of insurance, 
and externalities).
Limits to the adoption  
of modern managerial 
practices
Credit constraints, lack of information, and 
labor regulations limit innovation in 
managerial practices and the adoption of 
high-performance workplace incentives that 
increase the productivity of training.
Source: Authorsʼ elaboration
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The current literature faces two important methodological chal-
lenges. First is the difficulty of measuring OJT.  The definition of OJT 
can incorporate both formal training programs and informal learning-by- 
doing. Moreover, aspects such as duration or costs are difficult to calcu-
late. Second, OJT can be associated with productivity and wages without 
reflecting a causal relationship. Other factors, such as the level of techno-
logical development or management skills, can make firms more produc-
tive. These same factors could be facilitating investment in OJT, creating a 
positive association between OJT and productivity that does not reflect a 
causal relationship. Likewise, the decision to invest in training a particular 
worker may be determined by attributes of the worker that impact pro-
ductivity, such as, for example, educational attainment.
The vast majority of this literature uses data from developed coun-
tries and, despite the differences in the nature of the data and meth-
odologies, studies generally show that OJT increases firm productivity 
and worker wages. However, there is no consensus on the magnitude 
of these effects. In order to address the endogeneity of the OJT deci-
sion, many studies use fixed effects or dynamic panel-data models which 
in most cases find large, positive impacts (e.g. Bartel 1994; Almeida 
and Carneiro 2008). A meta- analysis by Haelermans and Borghans 
(2012) reported that the average effect on wage returns of workers 
who received OJT is 2.6 % per course. Fewer studies exploit exogenous 
changes in the decision to estimate the effects of training and, in con-
trast, find relatively small impacts (e.g. Leuven and Oosterbeek 2004, 
2008). However, as discussed by Bassanini et  al. (2005), it is unclear 
whether the results from this group of studies are generalizable given 
that samples are small and specific.
In developing countries, the evidence is much scarcer, largely due to 
limitations on the availability and quality of data. Applying matching tech-
niques on data from manufacturing firms in Kenya and Zambia, Rosholm 
et al. (2007) found very large positive effects: the average effect of receiv-
ing training in the year leading up to the survey was a 20 % increase in 
wages. Ibarrarán et al. (2009) estimated the impact of training with instru-
mental variables constructed from segments of firms with similar charac-
teristics and, in general, found that training increased productivity. Finally, 
Rodríguez and Urzúa (2011) used data from administrative records to 
measure the impact on Chilean workers who received training as a result 
of the Chilean government’s tax exemption program. They found that, in 
most cases, participation in the subsidy program had no positive impact 
on either the wages or the employment of participants. Only programs of 
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longer duration produced marginal impacts, slightly above zero, but this 
type of course is only offered in 1 % of cases. The authors also found no 
evidence of the effects of the program on hiring new workers.
Given the gaps in this literature, it is not surprising that there is practi-
cally no evidence regarding the social returns on OJT in LAC (Almeida 
et al. 2012). In fact, when it comes to social returns, even the literature 
for developed countries is lacking (Bassanini et al. 2005). This poses an 
important challenge for policy design.
 Data
We use the only two business surveys that, to the best of our knowledge, 
have cross-country comparable information on OJT in LAC. The first one 
is the WBES which has information about OJT for 12 countries in the 
region and longitudinal data for an important subset of countries.
The second one is the EPFE, which has been used in various coun-
tries in LAC with the support of the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB). This cross-sectional survey includes detailed questions about OJT 
that are not included in the WBES or other traditional business surveys, 
such as the components of OJT, its beneficiaries, and the sources of fund-
ing for training. At the time of writing, EPFE cross-sectional data was 
available for the Bahamas, Colombia, Honduras, Panama, and Uruguay 
from surveys collected between 2011 and 2013.3 In every country except 
Colombia, surveys were representative at the national level. In Colombia, 
sampling was designed to make the survey representative at the sectoral 
level for three specific sectors: manufacturing, commerce, and services. 
Due to space limitations, the tables and graphs in this chapter refer only 
to the figures corresponding to the manufacturing sector. We discuss the 
results for the other sectors in the endnotes.
 OJt in LaC: PraCtiCEs, POLiCiEs, anD DEtErminants
 Incidence and Intensity
Table 5.2 shows that, in almost all the sampled countries in LAC, at least 
a quarter of the surveyed firms offer some type of formal training to their 
full-time workers in a given year, and in many countries this share exceeds 
50 %.4 However, training levels vary widely from country to country. As 
we discuss later in this chapter, this cross-country variation is likely associ-
ated with factors such as the size and technology level of the firms.
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Because of the lack of information about the social returns on train-
ing, it is not possible to know if there is under-investment in OJT in 
LAC. However, we can see that the levels of OJT in the region are rela-
tively high compared to countries with similar income levels. Figure 5.1 
illustrates this point. The line shows the average incidence of training in a 




Incidence: proportion of 
firms that offer training 
(%)
Intensity: proportion of workers 
trained in manufacturing firms 
that offer training (%)
El Salvador 2010 60.4 54.1
Argentina 2010 58.1 61.2
Peru 2010 57.0 62.0
Colombia 2010 56.7 78.8




Bolivia 2010 54.1 43.8
Barbados 2010 53.1 n.a.
Brazil 2009 52.7 67.3
Paraguay 2010 51.7 61.0
Costa Rica 2010 48.9 71.0
Bahamas 2010 46.9 n.a.
Chile 2010 45.9 49.2
Mexico 2010 45.1 62.6
Guatemala 2010 43.6 67.7
Venezuela 2010 39.0 74.5
Nicaragua 2010 35.2 59.2
St. Kitts & Nevis 2010 35.0 n.a.
Saint Lucia 2010 34.2 n.a.
Honduras 2010 33.8 58.0




Jamaica 2010 26.1 41.8
Dominica 2010 22.4 n.a.
Panama 2010 8.6 67.6
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on WBES data
Notes: Calculation of the proportion of firms that train is based on the question: “During the [reference] 
fiscal year, did this establishment offer formal training programs for its full-time permanent employees?” 
Calculation of the proportion of workers trained in manufacturing firms is based on the question: “With 
respect to formal training programs for the [reference] fiscal year, what percentage of full-time permanent 
workers received formal training?” n.a. = not applicable
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set of 107 non-LAC countries. The points, which represent the incidence 
of OJT in LAC countries, are mostly located above the line. Thus, the 
incidence of OJT in LAC is generally higher than in other countries with 
similar per capita income. The only exceptions are Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, and Panama.
However, measures of incidence do not differentiate between firms 
that train many workers and those that train a few. For this reason, 
we also consider intensity indicators, which measure the proportion of 
workers trained. Because of the design of the WBES, this indicator can 
only be calculated for the manufacturing sector, where firms that pro-
vide OJT programs typically train between 38 and 78 % of their work-
ers (Table 5.2). The intensity of OJT can also be measured in terms of 
training duration. These figures, available only for the EPFE surveys 
conducted in Honduras and Uruguay, show that firms typically invest 
















































Fig. 5.1 Incidence of training in LAC and the rest of the world 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WBES data
Notes: The line shows the average incidence of training in a set of 107 non-LAC countries
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very different from the levels seen in Europe.5 However, this type of 
cross-country comparison should be considered with caution because 
of the differences in measurement and definitions.
 Beneficiaries of OJT: High- vs Low-Skilled Workers
Evidence from developed countries consistently shows that high-skilled 
workers are not only more likely to be trained, but the training they receive 
is also more intensive (e.g. Bassanini et al. 2005; Bishop 1996; Heckman 
2000; Frazis et al. 2000). This coincides with previous findings for LAC 
from Hunneus et al. (2011) and with the new findings we obtain from 
the EPFE, which show that low skilled workers in Honduras and Uruguay 
receive relatively shorter training.6 Moreover, the share of workers that 
receives training is higher for skilled than for low skilled workers, especially 
in Honduras and in small firms (Fig. 5.2).
If OJT is differentially targeted to the higher skilled workers, these 
investments will only help to amplify the skill gaps in the workforce. 
Fig. 5.2 Share of workers that received training by occupational category 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on the EPFE 
Notes: Small firms, 1 to 20 employees; medium firms, 21 to 100 employees; large firms, over 100 
employees
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This  is why some governments implement policies to stimulate training 
for workers with lower education levels. However, the literature that uses 
European data casts doubt on the cost-effectiveness of these efforts given 
how difficult it is to stimulate OJT for less skilled workers if the returns 
on these investments are very low (Bassanini et al. 2005). Recent evidence 
from Chile also points in this direction. A revision of the franquicia tribu-
taria, a tax deduction for OJT, shows that firms mostly use it to train the 
more educated workers even though the value of the deduction declines 
with the worker’s skill level (Ministry of Labor of Chile 2011). This high-
lights the importance of complementary efforts outside the workplace to 
increase the skills of the workforce, such as those aimed at building a life-
long training system.
 Contents of OJT: General vs Specific
Results from the EPFE show that, when deciding the content of train-
ing, firms in LAC give priority to the technical skills that are relevant in 
the workers’ current jobs and not to general skills.7 This result is robust 
to restricting the sample for different countries or firm sizes (Fig. 5.3) 
and is consistent with Bassi et  al. (2012) on Chile, Argentina, and 
Brazil.
This result is worth emphasizing for two reasons. First, as discussed 
earlier, even though training in specific skills can have a positive effect 
on productivity, it will likely have little impact on wages. This should be 
taken into account in the design of policies that target distributional goals. 
Second, recent evidence for LAC shows that socio-emotional or behav-
ioral skills are the most highly valued by employers and the most difficult 
to find in the labor market (Bassi et al. 2012).8 However, the fraction of 
firms that give priority to behavioral skills is much lower than the propor-
tion that prioritizes specific skills. This is consistent with the results of the 
study by Bassi et al. (2012) in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, which showed 
that even firms that have the greatest difficulties in fulfilling their require-
ments for socio-emotional skills tended to offer more training in specific 
skills.
The tendency to give more training in specific skills may result from 
a firm’s lack of capacity (e.g. methodologies and technologies) to teach 
general skills. It may also reflect the disincentives that arise due to a lack 
of appropriation given that, as discussed below, most of the OJT in the 
region is financed by the employer.
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 Financing OJT
Results from the EPFE show that, to finance OJT, firms typically allocate 
a fraction of their operating costs, ranging from 2 to 4 %, depending on 
the firm size. Moreover, since training usually takes place during working 
hours, firms generally also bear the extra costs in worker productivity as 
a result of hours missed.9 Data from EPFE suggests that in LAC, OJT is 
mostly financed by the employers. Table 5.7 (in the Appendix) shows that, 
regardless of firm size or country, at least 70 % of firms finance OJT with 
their own funds. Only a small percentage expects employees to use their 
personal funds or use public financing. However, due to the characteristics 
of the data, indirect financing by the employees through wage reductions 
cannot be ruled out.
Interestingly, in LAC, using public resources to finance OJT is no more 
frequent among small firms than among large- and medium-sized ones 
(see Table 5.7 in the Appendix). This result is consistent with the  findings 
Fig. 5.3 Proportion of firms that train by prioritized skill 
Source: Authorsʼ calculations based on the EPFE 
Notes: Figures calculated only for firms that train. Because respondents had the option of choosing more 
than one skill, the sum of the percentages in each category is not 100 %. Data for Colombia shown in this 
figure are calculated with the sample of firms in the manufacturing sector. Firms in the commerce and 
services sectors in Colombia display the same pattern, with the majority prioritizing training in specific 
skills. The option “does not prioritize” was not included. Due to special confidentiality protocols by the 
statistics office in Colombia, the authors of this study were unable to aggregate the data from Colombia 
with that of other countries to build the indicators by firm size
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for other regions (Almeida et al. 2012) and also resonates with the lit-
erature on R&D incentives, which has documented that firms are more 
likely to apply for R&D tax credits if they are large and have the capacity 
for innovation.10 To the extent that small firms face fewer credit restric-
tions and higher net returns, the subsidies might finance investments that 
would have happened anyway. Evidence of similar deadweight losses have 
also been documented in the literature that analyzes the effectiveness of 
incentives for R&D and innovation.11
In addition to subsidies and tax incentives (e.g. Chile and Uruguay), 
governments in LAC participate in the training market by directly provid-
ing free or low-cost training through public training institutes (e.g. SENA 
in Colombia or SENAI in Brazil). The evidence from the EPFE suggests 
that the role of these institutions in providing OJT is not significant: 
regardless of country and size, the share of firms that exclusively use exter-
nal providers to deliver training is no greater than one-third. Moreover, 
the majority of firms that offered training with an external provider relied 
on a private institution (see Table 5.7 in the Appendix).
Results from the WBES also show that only a minority of firms in 
the region use public funding for their training initiatives. In this sur-
vey, respondents were asked: “During the last 3 years, did this establish-
ment receive any public support (financial or otherwise) for training?” 
Despite the lack of specificity of the question, which could refer to any 
type of government support (e.g. public subsidies, technical support, or 
direct provision of training), of all the firms that trained, the percent-
age of firms that received public support was on average 18 (Fig. 5.4). 
Moreover, in 6 of the 11 countries, this percentage was less than 15. 
Chile is one exception, where over 60 % of firms received public sup-
port. This is likely due to the high level of coverage of the franquicia 
tributaria.12 Importantly, small firms use public support for training less 
than large enterprises, at only 13 % receiving any kind of public support 
compared to 22 % for large firms.
The low utilization of public instruments to promote OJT in LAC may 
be due to insufficient coverage. It may also reflect a lack of relevance, if 
these instruments do not target the market failures or barriers that firms 
face in the training decision. Unfortunately, the empirical literature does 
not shed light on this issue. As discussed previously, little is known about 
the market failures faced by employers in their decision to train, posing an 
important challenge in the design of policy instruments, whose relevance 
can only be assessed in terms of the ability to alleviate barriers to  training 
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investments. Recent reviews of the literature on employer-provided train-
ing in the international context have reached a similar conclusion (Almeida 
et al. 2012; Bassanini et al. 2005).
 Determinants of OJT in LAC
Below we provide suggestive evidence on the key factors that affect the 
decision to train in LAC. The market failures enumerated in Table 5.1 
guide our conclusions, including restrictions that affect both supply and 
demand for training. Three pieces of evidence suggest that restrictions on 
demand might play a key role in OJT decisions in the region.
First, results from the EPFE show that the main reason employers do 
not train is that they do not believe it is necessary. Table 5.3 shows that, 
regardless of the country or firm size, the most frequent reason firms do 
not train in Bahamas, Honduras, and Colombia is that it is not neces-
sary.13 This finding resonates with previous evidence for Brazil and Central 
America.14 While this result may be interpreted as evidence of lack of 
demand, it may also indicate that there is imperfect information about the 
returns on training. The next most cited reason for not offering training is 








































































Fig. 5.4 Percentage of firms offering OJT that received public support 
Source: Authorsʼ calculations based on WBES data
Notes: Small firms, 1 to 20 employees; medium firms, 21 to 100 employees; large firms, over 100 
employees
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Second, firms that do not train claim to have fewer difficulties meeting 
their human capital requirements. This is shown by the EPFE data, which 
includes a question on whether human capital constraints are a major 
obstacle to firm productivity. Regardless of the country or firm size, the 
share of firms identifying human capital constraints as a major obstacle 
is higher among firms that train.15 A similar conclusion emerges from an 
analysis of WBES data.16 Table  5.4 shows that among firms that train, 
about one in three (37 %) state that an inadequately educated workforce 
is a “major” or “very severe” obstacle. For firms that do not train, this 
proportion falls to just over one in four (29 %).
Accordingly, limitations on human capital are a greater obstacle for the 
firms that train than for those that do not. This is likely associated with 
large differences in the production process, workforce characteristics, and 
personnel between these two groups of firms (Table 5.4). Firms that train 
are, on average, larger and older, have a higher probability of being in the 
manufacturing sector, and a higher probability of obtaining credit from 
financial institutions (see Chap. 8). They also have more links with foreign 
markets and face a greater number of competitors (see Chap. 9). There are 
Table 5.3 Percentage of firms that do not train by reason not to provide 
training
Bahamas Honduras Colombia Less than 50 
employees
50 + employees
Training was not useful; 
waste of time
6.7 8.3 10.0 8.2 9.5
High cost 16.4 30.3 26.0 28.8 35.6
Does not know / has 
not found training 
institutions
5.8 25.5 5.8 24.1 20.0
Trained staff can leave 
the firm
2.3 7.7 10.7 7.2 10.1
Not possible to measure 
the benefits of training
3.9 4.0 n.a 4.1 1.5
No need to provide 
training; staff is 
sufficiently well trained
72.8 62.4 34.5 63.0 67.3
Source: Authorsʼ calculations based on EPFE
Notes: Each percentage measures the proportion of firms that did not train that chose each option as one 
of the two main reasons for not training. n.a. = not applicable
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also differences with respect to practices of innovation and business devel-
opment: firms that train also spend more on R&D and are more likely to 
have introduced new products and new or improved processes in recent 
years (see Chap. 2). Differences in the characteristics of the workforce 
are also present, such as the fraction of skilled workers and the experi-
ence of the most senior manager. Interestingly, there are no significant 
differences regarding the share of temporary workers, an attribute that in 
theory could affect the incentives to train if more temporary workers lead 
to a greater appropriation problem.17
Table 5.4 Characteristics of firms that train vs. firms that do not train
Traina Do not train P-Value (test 
differences)
General Attributes
Age of firm (years) 28 22 0.000
Number of employees 215 67 0.000
Fraction of domestic ownership 83 % 91 % 0.000
Manufacturer 76 % 53 % 0.000
Credit with financial institutions 66 % 48 % 0.000
Competition
Main product faced five or more competitors 38 % 30 % 0.000
Fraction of sales in domestic market 86 % 93 % 0.000
Innovation, Business Development, and Productivity
Has ISO certificate 38 % 13 % 0.000
Spending on R&D 45 % 12 % 0.000
Introduced new products in the past 3 years 56 % 26 % 0.000
Improved processes in the past 3 years 52 % 22 % 0.000
Workforce Characteristics and Human Capital Requirements
Fraction of permanent, full-time production  
workers that are skilledb
41 % 45 % 0.000
Fraction of production workers that are temporary 16 % 15 % 0.930
Lack of skills is major obstacle 37 % 29 % 0.000
Characteristics of Most Senior Manager
Years experience of highest manager in the sector 22.9 21.4 0.065
Number of firms 7486 10,190
Source: Authorsʼ calculations based on WBES data
Notes: aThe variable that indicates whether the firm trained or not is constructed from the question: “Over 
fiscal year X, did this establishment have formal training programs for its permanent, full-time employees?” 
where X is the reference year of the survey (2006 or 2010) bThis indicator is built from a question in the 
WBES survey that asked: “How many permanent, full-time production workers are skilled? How many are 
unskilled?” 
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Finally, the third result shows that the most important determinants of 
the training decision are the variables that measure innovation. To docu-
ment this, we use WBES data for 11 LAC countries collected in 2006 and 
2010 to estimate a probit model of the decision to train. We use a rich set 
of covariates that measure the characteristics of the firm and of the work-
ers.18 We also include dummy variables to control for country, year, and 
economic sector (manufacturing vs services). Separate estimates are made 
for the three subgroups of firms: small (less than 20 permanent employ-
ees), medium (over 20 to 100), and large (over 100).
The results are shown in Fig. 5.5. The location of the circles on the 
horizontal axis shows the marginal effects on the probability of training 
when the covariates are set at their average value. In the case of dummy 
Has ISO certificate
% of expenditure in R&D
Improved processes
Introduced new products
Lack of skills is a major obstacle








−.2 0 .2 .4 −.2 0 .2 .4 −.2 0 .2 .4
Small Medium Large
Marginal Effects
Credit with financial institution
Fig. 5.5 Determinants of the decision to train in LAC
Source: Authorsʼ calculations based on WBES data
Notes: This figure shows the results of probit models estimated with WBES data. The training variable is 
constructed from the question: “Over fiscal year X, did this establishment have formal training programs 
for its permanent, full-time employees?” where X is the reference year of the survey (2006 or 2010). 
Country dummy variables are also included
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variables, the marginal effects measure the effect of changing the variable 
from 0 to 1. Horizontal bars show the 95 % confidence intervals. The fig-
ure shows that, regardless of firm size, the most important determinants of 
the decision to train are those that measure innovation and technological 
development. For example, for small firms, the probability of training is 
associated with an increase of 18 percentage points if the firm has a quality 
certificate, 19 percentage points if R&D expenditures increase by 1 %, and 
10 percentage points if the firm has changed or improved its production 
processes in recent years. Interestingly, we find no difference in the mar-
ginal effects of the variables that measure innovations in products versus 
innovations in processes, even though the literature has stated that these 
may have differential effects on skill demand and on employment. Recent 
evidence for LAC has shown that product innovation may be more com-
plementary to skilled than to unskilled labor (Crespi and E. Tacsir 2012).
Having credit with a commercial bank is also a significant determinant 
of training for small and medium firms (7 and 6 percentage points, respec-
tively), suggesting liquidity constraints on OJT investments. Interestingly, 
the measures of the degree of competition (i.e. the number of competitors 
faced by the main product or product line in the market and the fraction of 
domestic sales) are not associated with training either, even though firms 
in more competitive markets could have greater incentives and need to 
invest in the human capital of their workers.
It is important to emphasize that the characteristics of the workforce, 
such as the proportion of skilled workers, do not seem to be associated with 
the decision to train. The same applies to the share of workers with a tempo-
rary contract, which is not statistically significant in any of the three models, 
even though this is a measure of turnover, which could lower a firm’s incen-
tives to provide training in general skills because of the appropriation prob-
lem. The study by Almeida and Aterido (2010) on small firms in developing 
countries also failed to find significant effects of worker turnover on OJT.
In summary, the three results presented in this section highlight the 
importance of the demand for skilled workers in the decision to train. The 
subset of firms that do not train may have fewer requirements for skilled 
workers, which could be associated with a lower degree of technological 
development. These results are consistent with the studies by Bassanini 
et al. (2005) for European countries and by Almeida and Aterido (2010) 
for developing countries.19 However, due to the available data, we can only 
examine correlations between the decision to train and the firms’ attri-
butes, and no causal interpretation should be given due to endogeneity.
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Nonetheless, even with these caveats, interesting conclusions emerge. 
First, the results highlight the importance of information problems that 
could be generating a misperception about the returns on OJT among 
firms in the region. Second, given that the demand for skilled workers 
seems to be playing a key role in the decision to train, public policies that 
attempt to create incentives for OJT mainly through subsidies may be 
insufficient. More comprehensive policies that not only facilitate the pro-
vision of training, but also aim to alleviate the constraints on technological 
adoption, may be required.
 rEturns On OJt amOng manufaCturing  
firms in LaC
As we noted earlier in this chapter, few studies provide empirical evidence 
about the productivity effects of OJT in LAC, probably due to the absence 
of adequate data. In this section, we make an effort to contribute to this 
literature. We take advantage of a longitudinal sample of manufacturing 
firms in 11 LAC countries for which OJT information was collected in 
2006 and 2010. Using this data, we estimate the effect of OJT on total 
factor productivity (TFP).20 Our empirical model is motivated by a simple 
conceptual framework. We assume a Cobb–Douglas production function 
to describe the technology of firm i:
 Yi i i iA K E=
α β  (5.1)
where Yi is output, Ai is an efficiency parameter, Ki measures the capi-
tal stock, and Ei is a measure of effective work. Following Dearden et al. 
(2000) and Zwick (2006), we define effective work as the weighted sum 
of trained, LCi, and untrained, LNi, labor:
 E L Li Ci Ni= +γ  (5.2)
where γ is greater than zero if the training has a positive impact on produc-





=  as 
the proportion of workers in which the firms make human capital invest-
ments by training, gives:
 Yi i i i iA K H L= + ( )( )α
β βγ −1 1  (5.3)
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Taking logs from equation 5.3 and with some algebra, we obtain the 
empirical model21:
 y h l k x ait h it l it k it it i it= + + + + +β β β ε  (5.4)
where yit is the logarithm of output, hit measures the intensity or incidence 
of training, lit is the log of hours worked by permanent and temporary 
employees, and kit is the logarithm of the value of the assets.22 The term 
ai is a fixed effect that measures time-invariant firm characteristics such as 
structural efficiency, administrative quality, and industrial relations, and εit 
is a time-varying error term. The subscript t denotes the years 2006 and 
2010, for which longitudinal data were collected.
The objective is to estimate the parameter βh. In this effort, we face 
two methodological challenges. First, time-invariant attributes of the firm, 
ai, can have an impact on both productivity and training. For example, 
greater managerial capacity may lead to higher levels of productivity and 
increase OJT investments. Second, training, input allocation, and produc-
tion decisions are affected simultaneously by unobservable productivity 
and demand shocks that vary over time, such as changes in work legisla-
tion or the introduction of a new product.
We therefore estimate equation 5.1 in two stages. In the first stage, 
the impact on the productivity of the production factors of capital and 
labor is calculated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) technique. By 
using the cost of intermediate inputs to approximate unobservable pro-
ductivity shocks, this technique, under certain assumptions, addresses 
the problem of endogeneity of the capital and labor inputs.23 In the 
second stage, we estimate the impact of training on productivity using 
a methodology that combines firm-level fixed effects with a broad set of 
time-varying controls. The dependent variable is the measure of TFP, vit, 
obtained as the residual of the production function estimated in the first 
stage with the Levinsohn and Petrin algorithm. The equation to estimate 
is described by:
 v h xit h it x it i t it= + + + +β β δ α µ  (5.5)
where the term δi corresponds to a vector of firm-level fixed effects. With 
these fixed effects we can control for time-invariant unobserved factors 
that may be simultaneously correlated with productivity and training. 
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The term αt is a year dummy that controls for confounding aggregate-level 
 factors that may have simultaneously affected productivity and training, 
such as the national business cycle.
However, even including this set of controls, the estimate of βh would 
be biased if the error term μit contains firm-specific time-varying shocks 
that simultaneously affect productivity and the decision to train. The lack 
of appropriate data to construct instrumental variables prevents us from 
implementing this identification strategy. Hence, in addition to using 
fixed effects, the estimate includes a series of exogenous variables at the 
firm level that vary over time. These variables, denoted as xit in equa-
tion 5.2, are constructed from interactions between the dummy indicat-
ing the year and a rich set of predetermined 2006 variables, including 
the number of employees, economic subsector, existence of quality cer-
tificates, product and process innovation, expenditures in R&D, propor-
tion of sales in the domestic market, existence of credit in the formal 
financial sector, an indicator of private and foreign ownership, share of 
skilled workers, share of temporary workers who are skilled, and the pro-
portion of temporary employees. With this rich set of controls, we try 
to capture productivity shocks that can be associated with the training 
decisions.
Table 5.5 presents the estimates for equation 5.5, in which the depen-
dent variable is the log of TFP. The endogenous variable of interest mea-
sures the intensity of training, calculated as the share of permanent workers 
who received training in the reference year. Column 1 reports the results 
of OLS models with no controls. Column 2 shows the results after adding 
firm-level fixed effects. Finally, column 3 shows the results after adding 
Table 5.5 Estimates of the impact of training on productivity
(1) (2) (3)






Observations 1479 1479 1461
Fixed effects No Yes Yes
Time-varying controls No No Yes
Source: Authorsʼ calculations based on WBES data
Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of increasing the proportion of trained workers. Estimates 
were obtained using value added per worker as an alternative measure of productivity and, similarly, no 
statistically significant training effects were found. Standard errors are in parentheses.
* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 % level, ** at the 5 % level, *** at the 1 % level; no asterisk 
means the coefficient is not different from zero with statistical significance
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fixed effects and the complete vector of time-varying firm-level exogenous 
variables, xit.
Column 1 shows a positive correlation between TFP and the intensity 
of training. A 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of skilled 
workers is associated with a 0.9 % increase in productivity. As mentioned 
previously, this parameter cannot be interpreted as a causal estimate of the 
effect of training because of possible time-varying shocks and unobserved 
firm heterogeneity that simultaneously determine training and production 
decisions. Column 2 shows that, with firm-level fixed effects, the estimate 
has a much smaller magnitude and is not statistically significant, a result 
that confirms the importance of correcting for unobserved firm heteroge-
neity. Column 3 shows that these estimates remain stable after a rich set of 
time-varying controls are included.
Table 5.6 shows the results of an alternative version of equation 5.2 that 
models the heterogeneous effects of training. We consider four  alternative 
Table 5.6 Heterogeneous effects of training
Panel A: Size and Age of the Firm


















Panel B: Fraction of Female and Temporary Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intensity −0.001 −0.001 0 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Intensity × high fraction of  
skilled workers
0.000 0.001 n.a. n.a.
(0.003) (0.004)
Intensity × high fraction of 
temporary workers
n.a. n.a. −0.005 −0.006*
(0.003) (0.003)
Observations 1479 1461 1479 1461
Firm-level fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time varying controls No Yes No Yes
Source: Authorsʼ calculations based on WBES data
Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of increasing the proportion of trained workers. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.
* Coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 % level, ** at the 5 % level, *** at the 1 % level; no asterisk 
means the coefficient is not different from zero with statistical significance. n.a. = not applicable
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sources of heterogeneity to examine if there are differential effects according 
to the characteristics of the firm (i.e. size and innovation) and characteristics 
of the workers (i.e. contractual stability and skill level).
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A show the result of estimates that extend 
equation 5.2 with an interaction term between the intensity of training 
and a dummy variable indicating whether the firm had over 100 employ-
ees in the baseline year, 2006. Columns 3 and 4 of Panel A show the 
results of replicating the exercise with a dummy variable that indicates 
if the firm improved processes in the three years before the baseline. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel B show the result of models in which the 
interactions are constructed to indicate if in 2006 more than 60 % of 
employees were temporary. Finally, in columns 3 and 4 of Panel B, the 
interactions show that in 2006 more than 75 % of permanent employees 
were skilled. All models include firm-level fixed effects, but the time-
varying controls are only included in the models presented in even-num-
bered columns.
The results show that the impact of training on productivity for firms 
with over 100 employees is positive. A 1 percentage point increase in 
the proportion of trained employees raises productivity by 0.6 or 0.7 %, 
depending on the specification. The magnitude of this effect is similar to 
the estimated effect by Zwick (2006) for German firms. No differential 
effects are found for firms that innovate more or for firms that have more 
skilled workers, in spite of evidence suggesting the existence of comple-
mentarities between OJT, innovation, and the skill level of workers. The 
absence of these effects could be due to imprecise measurements, and we 
recommend that further research be done in this area. Finally, for firms 
with a high share of temporary workers, increases in training intensity 
seem to have a marginally significant negative effect on productivity, 
although this result is not robust to both specifications.
Our results suggest that training has a positive impact on productivity 
only for larger firms. This may be because, as firms grow, there are larger 
spillover productivity effects from trained workers to a greater number 
of untrained workers. Middleton et  al. (1993) suggested an alternative 
explanation, stating that the existence of internal labor markets in large 
firms can result in higher returns from training because promotion oppor-
tunities make it more attractive for workers to stay in the firm, reducing 
the appropriation problem. A third possibility is that firm size is corre-
lated with good managerial skills and internal labor markets that reward 
ON-THE-JOB TRAINING IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN … 159
increased productivity by profit sharing and promotion (Lazear 1995). 
Finally, it is possible that larger firms provide a better quality of train-
ing due to the economies of scale of investing in training programs and 
technologies.
As a final caveat, we should mention two reasons why in these esti-
mations there may be an attenuation of the true training effects. First, 
because of the characteristics of the data, we are only able to estimate the 
contemporary effects of training on productivity and wages. However, as 
we mentioned previously, most of the training takes place during working 
hours, which means that workers spend less time on production. There is, 
in fact, evidence from developed countries that the level of worker produc-
tivity falls during training (Bartel 1994; Dearden et al. 2000). Thus, the 
productivity impact of training could be low or negative in the immediate 
term and positive in the medium or long term. This could also explain the 
negative effects on the subset of firms with a high proportion of tempo-
rary workers.
Second, measurement errors in the training variable can attenuate the 
estimated effect. This problem can be particularly severe in the type of 
models we estimate, which have fixed effects and only two periods of 
observations per firm. Even so, positive productivity impacts are found 
in larger firms. Thus, further studies are needed to provide more robust 
evidence of these impacts as well studies that identify the conditions (i.e. 
characteristics of the firms, training, and workers) in which OJT is more 
productive, since this would certainly improve the targeting of policy 
interventions.
 COnCLusiOns
One of the most important challenges that LAC economies face is increas-
ing the productivity of their workforces. In this effort, employer-provided 
training can play a key role by providing updated, relevant skills that are 
aligned with the demands of the market. In spite of their importance, little 
is known about the nature of the training investments made by firms in the 
region. This study aims to improve this knowledge.
We found that, in most countries in the region, between 30 and 50 % 
of firms offer training to their workers through programs that are usu-
ally short, structured, and mostly targeted to the more skilled workers. 
Training content prioritized job-specific skills, something that was consis-
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tent with the fact that the majority of the training was financed with funds 
from the employer. Public subsidies for OJT were not often used and were 
more likely to be used by larger firms. Also, few firms seemed to use public 
institutions as external training providers.
We also presented evidence suggesting that, regardless of the firm size, 
the decision to train is determined by the firms’ demand for skills, which, 
in turn, is associated with innovation and the adoption of more advanced 
production technologies. Finally, we assessed the effects of training on 
wages and productivity. Point estimates showed that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of trained employees raised productivity by 
0.7 %, but only in firms with more than 100 employees. We did not find 
evidence of wage effects from training. However, due to data limitations, 
our results should be interpreted with caution and may be a lower bound 
of the true effects.
Several policy recommendations emerge from these findings. First, the 
results are consistent with the view that providing training in general skills 
to low-skilled workers may have very low private returns for the firms. This 
highlights the importance of complementary policies to increase the skills 
of the workforce, such as developing lifelong vocational and educational 
training systems that allow workers to update their skills and reduce the 
skill gaps between individuals entering the workforce.
Our results also support the design of comprehensive interventions 
in which the instruments to promote OJT are part of a broader set of 
policies that foster technological transformation and innovation. Policies 
should take into account the coordination failure that may have caused 
some firms in the region to be caught in a low-technology low-skill trap. 
This means that some firms are not able to adopt skill-intensive produc-
tive technologies because of the lack of skilled workers and therefore do 
not invest in the human capital of their employees. Indeed, while this 
chapter shows that a lack of technology adoption limits human capital 
investments by firms, recent evidence shows that lack of skills impose 
serious constraints on the adoption of innovation in LAC (Hall and 
Maffioli 2008).
The results in this chapter also underscore the need for further research. 
First, there is a need to assess the magnitude of the private returns to OJT 
and how these are distributed between firms and workers. This implies 
making greater efforts in data collection, either by conducting longitu-
dinal surveys or using administrative data. An effort should also be made 
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to identify the complementary factors that make OJT productive, such as 
managerial decision-making. Suggestive evidence in this chapter indicates 
that OJT will have an impact on productivity if some of the attributes 
typical of larger firms are present. It is therefore important to identify the 
characteristics of the firms and personnel management practices required 
for training to be productive. Finally, an effort to identify the potential 
market failures that affect decisions about OJT is paramount to design 
evidence-based policies.
aPPEnDix
Table 5.7 Providing and financing training services






Percentage of firms that use at least one of the following sources to finance training
Public sources 2 % 24 % n.a. 7 % 13 % 14 % 35 % 19 %
Private credit n.a. 6 % n.a. 1 % 2 % 6 % 3 % 0 %
Establishment 
funds
86 % 81 % n.a. 87 % 75 % 78 % 80 % 94 %
Employee 
personal funds
12 % 4 % n.a. 4 % 4 % 4 % 4 % 5 %
Other 5 % 12 % n.a. 6 % 7 % 16 % 6 % 3 %
Percentage of firms that use as a provider
External provider 19 % 37 % 37 % 30 % 40 % 28 % 26 % 35 %
Internal provider 45 % 27 % 41 % 29 % 19 % 55 % 38 % 74 %
External and 
internal provider
36 % 36 % 22 % 41 % 41 % 18 % 36 % 21 %
Percentage of firms that use an external provider
Public external 
providers
32 % 35 % n.a. 32 % 62 % 21 % 37 % 46 %
Private external 
providers
81 % 84 % n.a. 87 % 38 % 74 % 90 % 81 %
Source: Authorsʼ calculations based on EPFE data
Notes: All statistics in the table are calculated for the subset of firms that train. The questionnaire allowed more 
than one choice of source of funding for the answer, so the percentages do not total 100 %. The denominator 
is the number of firms that trained in the reference year. The percentages for Colombia are calculated using 
only manufacturing firms. Firms in the commerce and services sectors display very similar patterns: the major-
ity of training is financed with establishment funds and external and internal providers are evenly distributed. 
Results are not presented due to space limitations but are available on request. Also, due to special confiden-
tiality protocols by the statistics office in Colombia, the authors of this study were unable to aggregate the data 
from Colombia with that of other countries to build the indicators by firm size. n.a. = not available
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nOtEs
 1. However, in a market with frictions, the predictions are different. Given that 
market wages do not fully reflect increases in productivity, firms may have 
incentives to finance general skills training. It has been established that cer-
tain institutional aspects that characterize domestic labor markets, such as 
minimum wages, result in this type of friction (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 
1999).
 2. For evidence on the impact of modern workplace practices on productivity 
see Black and Lynch (2001). More recently, Lazear et al. (2012) provided 
evidence of the impact of the quality of bosses (supervisors or managers) on 
productivity.
 3. The number of firms composing the sample in each country was: Bahamas, 
505; Honduras, 658; Panama, 757; Colombia, 8071; and Uruguay, 636. 
For Panama, the sample used was significantly smaller than the sample sur-
veyed because of problems with missing and inconsistent data.
 4. These training levels are constructed with WBES data from a question in 
which respondents were asked: “Over [the last complete fiscal year], did this 
establishment have formal training programs for its permanent, full-time 
employees?”
 5. In Scandinavian countries, which have the highest intensity levels in Europe, 
firms provide an average of 30 to 35 hours of training per employee per year 
(Bassanini et al. 2005).
 6. On average, high- and low-skilled workers in Honduras receive 37 and 22 
hours of training per year, respectively. In Uruguay, these figures are 23 and 
17 hours.
 7. The survey adopts the skills classification of Murnane and Levy (1996), 
which defined three categories: (i) specific skills of the occupation, defined as 
the techniques needed to develop a particular occupation that are not read-
ily applicable to other occupations or industries (e.g. training in the use of 
certain equipment in the textile sector); (ii) knowledge skills, defined as the 
basic areas of knowledge of the curriculum in the formal education system: 
reading, writing, arithmetic, reasoning, and critical thinking; and (iii) behav-
ioral or socio-emotional skills, related to responsibility, degree of commit-
ment, ability to work in groups, persistence, and self-control.
 8. The importance of socio-emotional skills in the working life of employees 
has been well documented in international literature (see Heckman et al. 
2006). Given that socio-emotional skills appear to be malleable even after 
adolescence, the return on investing in development of such skills would be 
higher than investing in the development of cognitive skills (Cunha and 
Heckman 2010).
 9. EFPE data shows that the share of firms that provide OJT during working 
hours are 67 % in Honduras, 97 % in Panama, and 91 % in Uruguay.
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 10. See, for example, Ferrero Zucoloto (2010) for evidence from Brazil and 
Mercer-Blackman (2008) for evidence from Colombia.
 11. See Chap. 2 and Ientile and Mairesse (2009) for a recent survey.
 12. Since its origins in the 1970s, the franquicia tributaria has operated as a 
financial subsidy for the training that firms contract directly with private 
providers. This subsidy is notable for its extensive coverage and for its long 
run duration. According to information from Chile’s National Training and 
Employement Service (Servicio Nacional de Capacitacion y Empleo, or 
SENCE), in 2011, 907,547 workers received OJT through this scheme, 
which represents 12 % of the workforce employed in the country, and 24,885 
firms that paid training costs via tax exemption during the same year. The 
delegation of training services to private providers that characterizes this 
system is unique in Latin America, where the state usually directly provides 
training services.
 13. Unlike previous tables, firms in this table are grouped in two size categories. 
The reason for the change is that the number of firms that do not train, have 
over 100 employees, and answered the question on the reason for not train-
ing is very small.
 14. Hunneus et al. (2011) found that, in Brazil, 63 % of informal micro-enter-
prises did not train because they did not need training. Almeida et al. (2012) 
reported that almost 90 % of firms in Central America did not provide for-
mal training because informal OJT was sufficient.
 15. A t-test shows that the differences between these proportions are statistically 
significant. These percentages cannot be constructed with the data for 
Panama and Colombia.
 16. The relevant survey question is: “Is an inadequately educated workforce No 
Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to 
the current operations of this establishment?”
 17. We would have liked to compare the use of workplace personnel practices 
(e.g. performance incentives, mentoring, or evaluations) but, unfortunately, 
the WBES do not collect information on this. The EPFE do not provide a 
rich set of information on these features either.
 18. Descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in Table 5.4, disaggre-
gated by training category.
 19. Almeida and Aterido (2010) used information from WBES in a sample of 99 
developing countries and obtained results that point in the same direction. 
Their evidence suggested that the lower investment in training in small and 
medium firms was largely due to a lower expected return on training 
investments.
 20. We choose a measure of TFP rather than sales per worker because arguably 
it is a more adequate proxy for productivity in commerce and services than 
in manufacturing. However, this may add noise to the outcome variable 
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given the plausible error in measurement of variables such as the value of 
capital stock. Therefore, we examine the sensitivity of our results to alterna-
tive outcomes.
 21. We use the approximation ln 1+( ) =x x and assume ( γ – 1)Hi is small.
 22. A. ll nominal variables were deflated at constant 2010 prices in  local cur-
rency and then converted to US dollars.
 23. More specifically, we estimate a Cobb–Douglas production function whose 
arguments are capital and labor, and which assumes that the error term 
incorporates a productivity shock observed by the firm but not by the econo-
metrician. We approximate this shock by a function of the cost of the inter-
mediate inputs. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) showed that this results in a 
consistent estimate of the production function if three assumptions are met: 
(i) the productivity shock must follow a first order Markov process and be 
independent of other decisions of the firm; (ii) the productivity shock must 
be the only unobservable state variable that is part of the demand function 
and intermediate inputs; and (iii) the demand for inputs must be a strictly 
growing function of productivity, conditional on other state variables.
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